2 changed files with 259 additions and 251 deletions
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+258 -0app/views/site/_scoring.html.erb
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+1 -251app/views/site/help.html.erb
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app/views/site/_scoring.html.erb
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| @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ | |||
| <h1>Scoring</h1> | |||
| <p> | |||
| Currently, CryptCheck gives note from <%= rank_label :G %> for the | |||
| worst sites to <%= rank_label :'A+' %> for the best ones. | |||
| </p> | |||
| <p> | |||
| Scoring is based on the fact that TLS handshake is <b>not</b> authenticated, | |||
| and so an attacker can force to use whatever cipher he wants as soon as both | |||
| client and server support it, with a downgrade attack as simple as modify | |||
| TCP packets on the fly. | |||
| </p> | |||
| <p> | |||
| Such downgrade attack doesn't require heavy resources and can be made with | |||
| standard computer or phone.<br/> | |||
| The only difficult part is to be in position to modify the traffic between | |||
| the client and the server. | |||
| This is the case if the attacker is connected on the same network as the | |||
| client (hotspot, 3G…) with simple | |||
| <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARP_spoofing">ARP spoofing</a>, | |||
| doable with tools like | |||
| <a href="https://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=1593990">Droid Sheep</a>.<br/> | |||
| </p> | |||
| <p> | |||
| As client support can't be guessed, CryptCheck considers the <b>weakest</b> | |||
| suite supported server side. | |||
| This way, a connection to the scored service can't lead to a negociated | |||
| handshake with a worse score than the one given to the service, whatever | |||
| your client supports and whatever an attacker is present or not. | |||
| </p> | |||
| <table class="scoring table table-bordered table-condensed center table-striped"> | |||
| <thead> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th rowspan="2">Score</th> | |||
| <td rowspan="2"></td> | |||
| <td colspan="3">Protection</td> | |||
| <td colspan="3">Weakness</td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <td>Best</td> | |||
| <td>Great</td> | |||
| <td>Good</td> | |||
| <td>Future</td> | |||
| <td>Weak</td> | |||
| <td>Deprecated</td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| </thead> | |||
| <tbody> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :'A+' %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Seriously take security into account and invest a lot on it.<br/> | |||
| Whatever the cost, encryption safety is implemented. | |||
| You can be proud! | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :A %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Seriously take security into account and invest a lot on it. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :'B+' %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Seriously take security into account and invest on it. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :B %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Take security into account and invest on it. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :'C+' %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Take security into account and invest a little on it. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :C %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Take security into account but don't spend too much for it. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :D %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Take security into account. Minimaly.<br/> | |||
| This is the worst score a decent service must have today. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :E %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Take security into account. A little. Or not. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :F %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Just don't take security into account. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :G %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Just don't take security into account at all.<br/> | |||
| What the fuck you do, dude? | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :'0' %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| No security at all. Just plain text.<br/> | |||
| Seriously, in <%= Date.today.year %>? | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td colspan="6"></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :V %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Invalid certificate (wrong domain, expired…) | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td colspan="6"></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :T %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Unstrusted certificate. Not issued by a trusted | |||
| <a href="https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/IncludedCACertificateReport">certificate authority</a>. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td colspan="6"></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :X %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Error occurs during the analysis. Try again later? | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td colspan="6"></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| </tbody> | |||
| </table> | |||
| <table class="scoring table table-bordered table-condensed"> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <td> | |||
| For protection:<br/> | |||
| <%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %> Fully implemented | |||
| <%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %> Partially implemented<br/> | |||
| Good: simple to implement, small protection<br/> | |||
| Great: quiet hard to implement, middle protection<br/> | |||
| Best: hard to implement, strong protection | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td> | |||
| For weakness:<br/> | |||
| <%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %> Not vulnerable | |||
| <%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %> Vulnerable<br/> | |||
| Future: known weakness, but no practical attack known<br/> | |||
| Weak: known weakness, pratical attack exist<br/> | |||
| Deprecated: known weakness, merely equivalent or equal to plain text | |||
| </td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| </table> | |||
| <p> | |||
| <i>Note</i>: Unlike HTTPS or XMPP, SMTP uses | |||
| <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS">opportunistic encryption</a>.<br/> | |||
| When you send an email, the server used to forward the mail (the | |||
| <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_transfer_agent">MTA</a>) to | |||
| the recipient has no way to guess in advance if recipient MTA supports or | |||
| not encryption and which cipher suite will be available. | |||
| To avoid your email returning to you in case of failure, the standard for | |||
| email encryption (<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3207">RFC 3207</a>) | |||
| requires to retry <b>in plain text</b> in case of encryption handshake | |||
| failure.<br/> | |||
| So, for SMTP, there is a compromise to make between strong configuration, | |||
| leading to plain text fallback for old or badly configured MTA, and | |||
| compatibility with such MTA to use weak encryption better than plain text | |||
| but allowing downgrade attack on stronger MTA.<br/> | |||
| Given email is a real nightmare for security, with multiple way to force a | |||
| connection to fallback to plain text | |||
| (<a href="https://www.eff.org/fr/deeplinks/2014/11/starttls-downgrade-attacks">STARTTLS stripping</a>, | |||
| <a href="https://labs.ripe.net/Members/stephane_bortzmeyer/dns-censorship-dns-lies-seen-by-atlas-probes">MX lying</a>…), | |||
| CryptCheck scores SMTP as HTTPS or XMPP and doesn't care about compatibility | |||
| trouble. This way, weak people are still weak, but strong people can (not | |||
| too much) hope strong encryption under normal condition.<br/> | |||
| Be advice than strong score here for SMTP means compatibility troubles. | |||
| Or fucked service which doesn't take care of your security. | |||
| I don't know, you turn to judge. | |||
| </p> | |||
+ 1
- 251
app/views/site/help.html.erb
View File
| @@ -1,257 +1,7 @@ | |||
| <div id="help" class="container"> | |||
| <div class="row"> | |||
| <div class="col-sm-12"> | |||
| <h1>Scoring</h1> | |||
| <p> | |||
| Currently, CryptCheck gives note from <%= rank_label :G %> for the | |||
| worst sites to <%= rank_label :'A+' %> for the best ones. | |||
| </p> | |||
| <p> | |||
| Scoring is based on the fact that TLS handshake is <b>not</b> | |||
| authenticated, and so an attacker can force to use whatever | |||
| cipher he wants as soon as both client and server support it, | |||
| with a downgrade attack as simple as modify TCP packets on the | |||
| fly. | |||
| </p> | |||
| <p> | |||
| Such downgrade attack doesn't require heavy resources and can be | |||
| made with standard computer or phone.<br/> | |||
| The only difficult part is to be in position to modify the | |||
| traffic between the client and the server. | |||
| This is the case if the attacker is connected on the same network | |||
| as the client (hotspot, 3G…) with simple | |||
| <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARP_spoofing">ARP spoofing</a>, | |||
| doable with tools like | |||
| <a href="https://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=1593990">Droid Sheep</a>.<br/> | |||
| </p> | |||
| <p> | |||
| As client support can't be guessed, CryptCheck considers the | |||
| <b>weakest</b> suite supported server side. | |||
| This way, a connection to the scored service can't lead to a | |||
| negociated handshake with a worse score than the one given to | |||
| the service, whatever your client supports and whatever an | |||
| attacker is present or not. | |||
| </p> | |||
| <table class="scoring table table-bordered table-condensed center table-striped"> | |||
| <thead> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th rowspan="2">Score</th> | |||
| <td rowspan="2"></td> | |||
| <td colspan="3">Protection</td> | |||
| <td colspan="3">Weakness</td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <td>Best</td> | |||
| <td>Great</td> | |||
| <td>Good</td> | |||
| <td>Future</td> | |||
| <td>Weak</td> | |||
| <td>Deprecated</td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| </thead> | |||
| <tbody> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :'A+' %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Seriously take security into account and invest a lot on it.<br/> | |||
| Whatever the cost, encryption safety is implemented. | |||
| You can be proud! | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :A %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Seriously take security into account and invest a lot on it. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :'B+' %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Seriously take security into account and invest on it. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :B %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Take security into account and invest on it. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :'C+' %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Take security into account and invest a little on it. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :C %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Take security into account but don't spend too much for it. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :D %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Take security into account. Minimaly.<br/> | |||
| This is the worst score a decent service must have today. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :E %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Take security into account. A little. Or not. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :F %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Just don't take security into account. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :G %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Just don't take security into account at all.<br/> | |||
| What the fuck you do, dude? | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td></td> | |||
| <td><%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :V %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Invalid certificate (wrong domain, expired…) | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td colspan="6"></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <th><%= rank_label :T %></th> | |||
| <td class="left"> | |||
| Unstrusted certificate. Not issued by a trusted | |||
| <a href="https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/IncludedCACertificateReport">certificate authority</a>. | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td colspan="6"></td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| </tbody> | |||
| </table> | |||
| <table class="scoring table table-bordered table-condensed"> | |||
| <tr> | |||
| <td> | |||
| For protection:<br/> | |||
| <%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %> Fully implemented | |||
| <%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %> Partially implemented<br/> | |||
| Good: simple to implement, small protection<br/> | |||
| Great: quiet hard to implement, middle protection<br/> | |||
| Best: hard to implement, strong protection | |||
| </td> | |||
| <td> | |||
| For weakness:<br/> | |||
| <%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %> Not vulnerable | |||
| <%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %> Vulnerable<br/> | |||
| Future: known weakness, but no practical attack known<br/> | |||
| Weak: known weakness, pratical attack exist<br/> | |||
| Deprecated: known weakness, merely equivalent or equal to plain text | |||
| </td> | |||
| </tr> | |||
| </table> | |||
| <p> | |||
| <i>Note</i>: Unlike HTTPS or XMPP, SMTP uses | |||
| <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS">opportunistic encryption</a>.<br/> | |||
| When you send an email, the server used to forward the mail | |||
| (the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_transfer_agent">MTA</a>) | |||
| to the recipient has no way to guess in advance if recipient MTA | |||
| supports or not encryption and which cipher suite will be | |||
| available. | |||
| To avoid your email returning to you in case of failure, the | |||
| standard for email encryption | |||
| (<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3207">RFC 3207</a>) | |||
| requires to retry <b>in plain text</b> in case of encryption | |||
| handshake failure.<br/> | |||
| So, for SMTP, there is a compromise to make between strong | |||
| configuration, leading to plain text fallback for old or badly | |||
| configured MTA, and compatibility with such MTA to use weak | |||
| encryption better than plain text but allowing downgrade attack | |||
| on stronger MTA.<br/> | |||
| Given email is a real nightmare for security, with multiple way | |||
| to force a connection to fallback to plain text | |||
| (<a href="https://www.eff.org/fr/deeplinks/2014/11/starttls-downgrade-attacks">STARTTLS stripping</a>, | |||
| <a href="https://labs.ripe.net/Members/stephane_bortzmeyer/dns-censorship-dns-lies-seen-by-atlas-probes">MX lying</a>…), | |||
| CryptCheck scores SMTP as HTTPS or XMPP and doesn't care about | |||
| compatibility trouble. This way, weak people are still weak, but | |||
| strong people can (not too much) hope strong encryption under | |||
| normal condition.<br/> | |||
| Be advice than strong score here for SMTP means compatibility | |||
| troubles. | |||
| Or fucked service which doesn't take care of your security. | |||
| I don't know, you turn to judge. | |||
| </p> | |||
| <%= render partial: 'scoring' %> | |||
| </div> | |||
| </div> | |||
| </div> | |||