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@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ |
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##= require jquery |
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##= require bootstrap/dropdown |
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##= require_tree . |
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|
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ |
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#about, #help { |
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margin-bottom: 20px; |
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p { |
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font-size: 1.25em; |
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} |
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} |
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|
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#donorbox { |
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background: #2d81c5 url(<%= image_path 'donorbox.png' %>) no-repeat 18px center; |
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color: #fff; |
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text-decoration: none; |
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font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; |
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display: inline-block; |
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font-size: 16px; |
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padding: 13px 17px 13px 56px; |
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-webkit-border-radius: 2px; |
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-moz-border-radius: 2px; |
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border-radius: 2px; |
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box-shadow: 0 1px 0 0 #1f5a89; |
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text-shadow: 0 1px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.3); |
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} |
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|
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#liberapay, #donorbox, #paypal { |
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img { |
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height: 50px; |
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max-width: 140px; |
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} |
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} |
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|
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table.scoring img { |
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width: 30px; |
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} |
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@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ |
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<div id="help" class="container"> |
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<div class="row"> |
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<div class="col-sm-12"> |
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<h1>Scoring</h1> |
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|
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<p> |
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Currently, CryptCheck gives note from <%= rank_label :G %> for the |
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worst sites to <%= rank_label :'A+' %> for the best ones. |
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</p> |
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|
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<p> |
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Scoring is based on the fact that TLS handshake is <b>not</b> |
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authenticated, and so an attacker can force to use whatever |
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cipher he wants as soon as both client and server support it, |
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with a downgrade attack as simple as modify TCP packets on the |
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fly. |
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</p> |
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|
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<p> |
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Such downgrade attack doesn't require heavy resources and can be |
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made with standard computer or phone.<br/> |
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The only difficult part is to be in position to modify the |
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traffic between the client and the server. |
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This is the case if the attacker is connected on the same network |
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as the client (hotspot, 3G…) with simple |
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<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARP_spoofing">ARP spoofing</a>, |
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doable with tools like |
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<a href="https://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=1593990">Droid Sheep</a>.<br/> |
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</p> |
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|
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<p> |
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As client support can't be guessed, CryptCheck considers the |
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<b>weakest</b> suite supported server side. |
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This way, a connection to the scored service can't lead to a |
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negociated handshake with a worse score than the one given to |
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the service, whatever your client supports and whatever an |
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attacker is present or not. |
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</p> |
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|
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<table class="scoring table table-bordered table-condensed center table-striped"> |
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<thead> |
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<tr> |
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<th rowspan="2">Score</th> |
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<td rowspan="2"></td> |
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<td colspan="3">Protection</td> |
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<td colspan="3">Weakness</td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<td>Best</td> |
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<td>Great</td> |
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<td>Good</td> |
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|
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<td>Future</td> |
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<td>Weak</td> |
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<td>Deprecated</td> |
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</tr> |
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</thead> |
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<tbody> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :'A+' %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Seriously take security into account and invest a lot on it.<br/> |
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Whatever the cost, encryption safety is implemented. |
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You can be proud! |
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</td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :A %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Seriously take security into account and invest a lot on it. |
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</td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :'B+' %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Seriously take security into account and invest on it. |
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</td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :B %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Take security into account and invest on it. |
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</td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :'C+' %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Take security into account and invest a little on it. |
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</td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :C %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Take security into account but don't spend too much for it. |
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</td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :D %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Take security into account. Minimaly.<br/> |
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This is the worst score a decent service must have today. |
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</td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :E %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Take security into account. A little. Or not. |
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</td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :F %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Just don't take security into account. |
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</td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %></td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :G %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Just don't take security into account at all.<br/> |
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What the fuck you do, dude? |
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</td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td></td> |
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<td><%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %></td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :V %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Invalid certificate (wrong domain, expired…) |
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</td> |
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<td colspan="6"></td> |
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</tr> |
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<tr> |
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<th><%= rank_label :T %></th> |
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<td class="left"> |
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Unstrusted certificate. Not issued by a trusted |
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<a href="https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/IncludedCACertificateReport">certificate authority</a>. |
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</td> |
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<td colspan="6"></td> |
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</tr> |
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</tbody> |
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</table> |
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<table class="scoring table table-bordered table-condensed"> |
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<tr> |
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<td> |
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For protection:<br/> |
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<%= image_tag 'check-full.svg' %> Fully implemented |
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<%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %> Partially implemented<br/> |
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|
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Good: simple to implement, small protection<br/> |
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Great: quiet hard to implement, middle protection<br/> |
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Best: hard to implement, strong protection |
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</td> |
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<td> |
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For weakness:<br/> |
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<%= image_tag 'check-empty.svg' %> Not vulnerable |
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<%= image_tag 'cross-red.svg' %> Vulnerable<br/> |
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|
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Future: known weakness, but no practical attack known<br/> |
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Weak: known weakness, pratical attack exist<br/> |
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Deprecated: known weakness, merely equivalent or equal to plain text |
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</td> |
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</tr> |
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</table> |
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|
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|
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<p> |
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<i>Note</i>: Unlike HTTPS or XMPP, SMTP uses |
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<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS">opportunistic encryption</a>.<br/> |
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When you send an email, the server used to forward the mail |
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(the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_transfer_agent">MTA</a>) |
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to the recipient has no way to guess in advance if recipient MTA |
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supports or not encryption and which cipher suite will be |
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available. |
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To avoid your email returning to you in case of failure, the |
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standard for email encryption |
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(<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3207">RFC 3207</a>) |
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requires to retry <b>in plain text</b> in case of encryption |
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handshake failure.<br/> |
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So, for SMTP, there is a compromise to make between strong |
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configuration, leading to plain text fallback for old or badly |
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configured MTA, and compatibility with such MTA to use weak |
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encryption better than plain text but allowing downgrade attack |
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on stronger MTA.<br/> |
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Given email is a real nightmare for security, with multiple way |
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to force a connection to fallback to plain text |
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(<a href="https://www.eff.org/fr/deeplinks/2014/11/starttls-downgrade-attacks">STARTTLS stripping</a>, |
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<a href="https://labs.ripe.net/Members/stephane_bortzmeyer/dns-censorship-dns-lies-seen-by-atlas-probes">MX lying</a>…), |
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CryptCheck scores SMTP as HTTPS or XMPP and doesn't care about |
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compatibility trouble. This way, weak people are still weak, but |
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strong people can (not too much) hope strong encryption under |
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normal condition.<br/> |
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Be advice than strong score here for SMTP means compatibility |
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troubles. |
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Or fucked service which doesn't take care of your security. |
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I don't know, you turn to judge. |
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</p> |
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</div> |
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</div> |
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</div> |
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Loading…
Reference in new issue